Meta‐analysis: the glass eye of evidence‐based practice?Meta‐analysis was developed as a technique for combining the results of many different quantitative studies: it is often used to produce quantitative estimates of causal relations and/or association between variables. Meta‐analysis is sometimes regarded as a central component of evidence‐based practice. We draw attention to an incompatibility in the epistemology and methods of reasoning in quantitative meta‐analysis and the epistemology and reasoning implicit in expert practice. We argue that this may be because the common (...) perception of meta‐analysis appeals to truth as correspondence; we suggest that rejecting the naïve realism that underpins truth as correspondence allows meta‐analysis to be understood in terms of truth as coherence. We can then develop an account of meta‐analysis that does not depend upon reduction to a mathematical procedure but is an attempt to maximise coherence in beliefs about what works that is consistent with clinical reasoning in expert practice. (shrink)

LEssOn OnE: What Is Evolution? OVERVIEW This lesson engages students in the concepts and processes of biological evolution. It also introduces the EVO DVD. The lesson begins by viewing Question 1 of the DVD, which introduces the World ...

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity’s most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as (...) if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities. (shrink)

Ectogenesis, or the use of an artificial womb to allow a foetus to develop, will likely become a reality within a few decades, and could significantly affect the abortion debate. We first examine the implications for Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, which argues for a woman’s right to withdraw life support from the foetus and so terminate her pregnancy, even if the foetus is granted full moral status. We show that on Thomson’s reasoning, there is no right to the death (...) of the foetus, and abortion is not permissible if ectogenesis is available, provided it is safe and inexpensive. This raises the question of whether there are persuasive reasons for the right to the death of the foetus that could be exercised in the context of ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis have examined several arguments for this right, doubting that it exists, while Joona Räsänen has recently criticized their reasoning. We respond to Räsänen’s analysis, concluding that his arguments are unsuccessful, and that there is no right to the death of the foetus in these circumstances. (shrink)

This book provides extensive and critical engagement with some of the most recent and compelling arguments favoring abortion choice. It features original essays from leading and emerging philosophers, bioethicists and medical professionals that present philosophically sophisticated and novel arguments against abortion choice. The chapters in this book are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of essays focuses primarily on unborn human individuals--zygotes, embryos and fetuses. In these chapters it is argued, for example, that human organisms begin to exist (...) at conception and that zygotes, embryos and fetuses are persons. These chapters also explore questions about whether or not zygotes, embryos and fetuses are part of their mothers' bodies. The second set of essays focuses primarily on elective abortion and the debates surrounding it. These chapters consider whether or not opponents of abortion are commonly hypocritical, how opponents of abortion should think about adoption, how emerging technologies may affect the current debate and whether or not those participating in the debate should rely on analogies to support their case. Finally, the third set of essays shifts focus from the legal and moral status of elective abortion to its place in medical practice. In these chapters it is argued that elective abortion embodies a kind of ableism, and that elective abortion is medically unnecessary, harmful to women's mental health and that telemedicine abortion poses significant risks to women's health. Agency, Pregnancy and Persons offers an up-to-date examination of unborn human beings, the debates surrounding elective abortion and the place of elective abortion within medical practice. It will be of interest to medical professionals and those who work in philosophy, bioethics and medical ethics alike. (shrink)

In their target article, “Proposed Principles for International Bioethics Conferencing: Anti-Discriminatory, Global, and Inclusive,” Jecker et al. (2024) highlight the growing international scope o...

In ’Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ’future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder is also (...) not grounded in the badness of death, which is strongly counterintuitive. There is an alternative: we can save our intuitions by adopting a more moderate Epicurean account such as that proposed by David Hershenov, who grounds the wrongness of killing in the prevention of the benefit of further good life rather than in the badness of death. Hershenov’s account, however, is equally applicable to Marquis’ argument: abortion similarly prevents a fetus from enjoying the benefit of a future like ours. Consequently, we conclude that Christensen’s criticism of Marquis’ argument fails to undermine his reasoning. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 469-471, May 2022.

To determine when the life of a human organism begins, Mark T. Brown has developed the somatic integration definition of life. Derived from diagnostic criteria for human death, Brown’s account requires the presence of a life‐regulation internal control system for an entity to be considered a living organism. According to Brown, the earliest point at which a developing human could satisfy this requirement is at the beginning of the fetal stage, and so the embryo is not regarded as a living (...) human organism. This, Brown claims, has significant bioethical implications for both abortion and embryo experimentation. Here, we dispute the cogency of Brown’s derivation. Diagnostic criteria for death are used to determine when an organism irreversibly ceases functioning as an integrated whole, and may vary significantly depending on how developed the organism is. Brown’s definition is derived from a specific definition of death applicable to postnatal human beings, which is insufficient for generating a general definition for human organismal life. We have also examined the bioethical implications of Brown’s view, and have concluded that they are not as significant as he believes. Whether the embryo is classified as a human organism is of peripheral interest—a far more morally relevant question is whether the embryo is a biological individual with an identity that is capable of persisting during development. (shrink)

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, (...) and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide. (shrink)

Leslie Armour argues for the rules of a dialectical logic which can account for the metaphysical problems of stability and change. He proposes a specific/general exclusion reference, a variation of the polar opposites contrast, which will make possible a rigorous development of the core structural concepts necessary for systematic explanation. His initial move is significantly different from Hegel’s being-nothing-becoming triad. The opposite of "pure being," Armour contends, is "pure disjunction." "Being" unifies, "disjunction" makes distinctions possible. Seven more categories are developed, (...) each at lower levels of abstraction, to introduce actual specificity and change. Armour’s main contention is that Hegel erred in introducing concrete "becoming" at a high level of logical abstraction. The ordering of his concepts is straightforward. "Pure being" contrasted with "pure disjunction" necessitates "determinate being." "Systematic unity" unifies the opposing elements in and. "Pure process" establishes the possibility of ongoing experience. Particularity is accounted for by the concepts of "determinate process" instantiated in the contrast of "ideal" and "objective universality" realized in the "dialectical individual." The final concept maintains the tension between structure and actualization without resulting in mere vacillation. This is done by arguing that self-identity is not a matter of bodily and dispositional consistency, but, rather, the pursuit of reasonableness. Armour contends that we identify people by the coherence of their actions which is understood in the context of an overall structure, such as the one he proposes. Some will be bothered by Armour’s admission that the development of the concepts of specificity cannot exemplify the necessity of the more general initial dialectical concepts. Others will be attracted to the degree of freedom for the subject in his concept of individuality which is supported by a clear systematic account.—P. G. W. S. (shrink)

The fine structure constant α ≡ e2/ c ≈ 1/137 is one of the fundamental parameters of the standard model of particle physics. There is a long history of attempts to derive the measured value of α from an underlying theory, or exhibit it in the form of a compact mathematical expression [2–4, 6, 8, 14–16]. The most significant advance in this endeavour was made by Dirac, who showed that if magnetic monopoles exist, with magnetic charge μ, then..

two dimensions, quantum radiation production is incompatible with a conserved and traceless T„,. We therefore resolve an ambiguity in our expression for Tr„, regularized by a geodesic point-separation procedure.

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of Neoclassical (...) General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

Cortical stimulation has been used for brain mapping for over a century, and a standard assumption is that stimulation interferes with task execution due to local effects at the stimulation site. Stimulation can however produce afterdischarges which interfere with functional localization and can lead to unwanted seizures. We previously showed that cognitive effort can terminate these afterdischarges, when termination thus occurs, there are electrocorticography changes throughout the cortex, not just at sites with afterdischarges or sites thought functionally important for the (...) cognitive task used, and thresholds for afterdischarges and functional responses can change among stimulation trials. We here show that afterdischarge termination can occur prior to overt performance of the cognitive tasks used to terminate them. These findings, taken together, demonstrate that task-related brain changes are not limited to one or a group of functional regions or a specific network, and not limited to the time directly surrounding overt task execution. Discrete locations, networks and times importantly underpin clinical behaviors. However, brain activity that is diffuse in location and extended in time also affect task execution and can affect brain mapping. This may in part reflect fluctuating levels of attention, engagement, or motivation during testing. (shrink)

Inconsistencies in the usual interpretation of the absorber theory of radiation are exposed which invalidate an experiment proposed recently by Heron and Pegg. An earlier experiment by Partridge necessarily gave a null result owing to absorption on the far side of the Earth of any advanced radiation which may have been present.